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Brigate Rosse and Moro Kidnappig: secrets and lies

Waiting for the whole site to be translated, I've published the following summary of the ninth chapter: "Rilettura critica della storia delle Brigate Rosse e del rapimento di Aldo Moro".

On the 16th of March 1978, Red Brigades or Brigate Rosse - the strongest terroristic organisation of the seventies in Italy - kidnapped Aldo Moro former premier and leader of the Christian Democratic Party (Democrazia Cristiana). First of all, it's important to remark the existence of some strange circumstances which led people to think about the strong possibility of interventions from outside the organisation. Those "coincidences" reached their top just during the unlawful imprisonment of Aldo Moro, about which some secrets and lots of lies are still being told and some questions are still unanswered. Let's try to reflect about some of them. One of the main features of the developing course of the Red Brigades may be related to the presence of people who didn't belong to the organisation. That must not seen as a surprising fact. Today we know that different forces were at work and had successfully entered most of the hottest environments in 1968, the period to which we can look as the cradle of the armed struggle. In the summer of 1967 for example, the CIA promoted the so-called "KAOS OPERATION". The aim of this operation was to struggle against the young people rebel movement in Europe but also to make the protest become violent and less attractive than it was seen before by the public opinion too. Considering that, it's not a strange discovery that intruder agents started infiltrating the organisation very early. Silvano Girotto was one of the most important agent. He was a former monk who helped to capture two historic leaders of the Red Brigades in 1974. It's a matter of fact that the militarization of Brigate Rosse began from that moment. Es I've already said, the strangest things about this terrorist group may be found in the Moro kidnapping. In fact, many strange facts aroused unsolved questions since the starting phase of Moro's 55-days imprisonment. I've divided these circumstances into two groups: the indirect and the direct ones. I think that this may be a good way to define the two kinds of help received by Brigate Rosse that morning. Let us talk about the first group. On the morning of the 16th of March 1978 a private radio connected to the roman revolutionary left-wing, broadcasted in advance that something very very serious would have happened. I don't sincerely believe that it was a divination, I think instead that the piece of news of the kidnapping had entered the revolutionary roman left-wing from the inside of the Red brigades. Now we know that the legal revolutionary left-wing area was full of agents belonging to the police forces since then. Moreover, other questions still need to be answered: how did the terrorists know that Aldo Moro's car would have passed by Fani street that morning, considering that the chief of his escort had the strict duty to change its route every single day? The terrorists replied that they didn't know the route of Moro's car and that they only made a shot in the dark, being just successful. It's hard to accept this explanation, also because the Red Brigades had punctured the tyres of a car which belonged to Spiriticchio, a flower-seller usually standing just nearby Fani street. Another fact. On that morning a secret service member, Colonel Guglielmi, was not far from the place of the slaughter and when he was asked about what he was doing there, he replied that he was going to a friend's house for lunch. In Italy, but I think in England as well, it is an unusual think to have lunch at 9 o'clock in the morning, and it's also strange that Colonel Guglielmi did not hear anything. In addition to this, the telephone line was interrupted immediately after the action and the terrorists were easily able to escape. Somebody asserted that it got stopped up because of the high number of telephone calls. Now we know, that on the day before the kidnapping, the side of the telephone company connected to the military secret service had already been alarmed. Such a thing was expected to happen in case of emergencies, such as international crisis, wars, and terroristic actions. Once again I really don't think it was a foreknowledge. Furthermore, after their escape, terrorists had to change their car in Bitossi street where usually a police car controlled the house of a judge. On that morning that police car received the order to go away, so no policeman were there when Moro's car passed by. Another coincidence ? And again: why did the terrorists use only two cars to escape ? Really a strange thing if we consider that in less important actions they had made use of at least three cars. One more question is: Why did many cartridge cases found that morning belong to the N.A.T.O. army? And... The terrorist stole only 2 bags from Moro's car, exactly the ones containing the evidence that the President Moro had been involved in the so-called Lokeed scandal by Henry Kissinger. Was it a matter of chance? These are still unanswered questions. Let's now focusing on what I have defined as the "indirect circumstances". The kidnapping action has been defined as a jewel of perfection. Aldo Moro's escort had to be killed but Moro had to remain safe. This wasn't an easy task for the Red Brigades, in fact, as they admitted, they were not so trained to give shot. Probably they needed the help of someone, may be of the 'NDRANGHETA CALABRESE, and above all of a professional killer during the most difficult phases of the kidnapping. There are many evidences of this: firstly, the journeys to Calabria taken by Mario Moretti (the Brigate Rosse leader), about which nobody inside the organisation knew anything. Secondly, the majority of the shots were fired from the same gun: 49 out of the 93 cartridge-cases found. The 49 ones were all the resolutely ones; some witnesses described also the presence of a cold, high professional killer. Another question is due: why did the terrorists wear ALITALIA uniforms ? A very clever thing to be done, in order not to been shot - by mistake- by somebody who had never seen them before; somebody who otherwise might have mistaken them for the escort men. Besides, another strange fact was that some photos, taken accidentally by a witness during the action, happened to disappear after they had been already given to the judges and after that some gangsters had been searching for them. At present we are certain that after the kidnapping some members of the Christian democrats party established contacts with MAFIA, CAMORRA, common gangsters and with the revolutionary left-wing as well. The aim was to find out Moro's place of imprisonment and we know that somebody managed to do it. We also know that those people from the DC party realised afterwards that the kidnapping might have been better exploited. Two events, form my perspective, changed the further course of the kidnapping: the Red Brigades base in Gradoli street and the false communiqué number 7 were both discovered on April the 18th . The base in Gradoli street was discovered in a very strange way: some people living downstairs called the fireman to stop a leak coming from the flat where Mario Moretti used to sleep. When the firemen arrived they realised that the leak had been provoked by intentionally directing the water-pipe towards some holes on the wall. Of course police and Televisions arrived very soon (and very noisily) founding guns, propaganda materials and a red brigades archive. My opinion is that somebody might have entered that flat to look for something; in fact there was such a mess inside: guns and hand bills were put in disorder on the bed and that was not a Red brigades habit. Who did contribute to find out the base ? If police had waited for Moretti he might have been easily arrested. Much noise was made instead and this lack of attention might have had a part in a plan. It is a fact that a lot of people knew the Brigate Rosse base in Gradoli street. For example, the president of European committee Romano Prodi said he had herd the name "GRADOLI" during a "spiritualistic seance" which he had taken part in near Bologna. I'm pretty inclined to believe that the world "GRADOLI" had come from the inside of revolutionary left-wing and that the seance was a sort of means to protect the source. Now we know also that the building in Gradoli street belonged to a society which was used es a cover by the Italian secret services. On the same day another fact happened which was connected, I think, with the ones I have just spoken about: the arriving of the communiqué number 7 signed by the red brigades. It was anomalous if compared with the others made by the terrorists during the kidnapping. The communiqué, which made people know that Moro had committed suicide, was in fact false. It was written by Tony Chichiarelli, a good forger connected with the renown criminal band called BANDA DELLA MAGLIANA; but anyway, it was written with the same typewriter usually used by the Red Brigades. I think the two events were not a matter of chance : somebody might have had the intention to give the red brigades an advice as well as to look for Aldo Moro's Documents (the so-called MEMORIALE) . Maybe somebody wanted Brigate Rosse to understand that other people knew their bases and were able to destroy them at any moment. And the allusion to Aldo Moro's suicide was a clear warning to made them to remember what had happened to the Rute Armee Fraktion leaders in Germany. The discovery of the Gradoli street base probably convinced Moretti that also the Aldo Moro Prison had become unsafe; as a result, it's pretty probable that the president was then quickly moved to another place. Unfortunately, the destiny of the kidnapping was already changed. With the double message of the 18th of April the kidnapping management entered a new phase. Red brigades couldn't any longer follow their plans and they had to underlie a superior will. Which will are we talking about? We may suppose we are talking about parts of the diverted state machine together with its occasionally alley - the BANDA DELLA MAGLIANA - which Tony Chichiarelli belonged to. Another event can confirm the change of the kidnapping management - and maybe of Moro himself - into the hands of BANDA DELLA MAGLIANA. After the death of Aldo Moro, Chichiarelli left a purse in a taxi. In that purse there were some objects making people understand that Chichiarelli himself knew Moro's events very very well. A short time after, Tony Chichiarelli and BANDA DELLA MAGLIANA made a rubbery in a bank of Rome of about 35 milliards of lire, a fortune at that time. Once again Chichiarelli left a message: a Polaroid photo of Aldo Moro taken during the kidnapping. My opinion is that Chichiarelli made that rubbery as a sort of "return" for his help during the kidnapping from members of the diverted state machine. To put it more clear, today we know that, during the 55-days imprisonment, Aldo Moro spoke about many secrets of the so-called First republic: the attempt of coup led by De Lorenzo, the massacre of Piazza Fontana, the rule of Christian democracy in the so-called "Strategy of tension", the secret services reform, the Lokeed affair and the anti-guerrilla plans that NATO had made to help our country. He also spoke about the power system and the illegal economic founds of his own political party. Too many secrets and too dangerous as well. Indeed, it's logical to ask why Brigate Rosse didn't reveal the whole memorial written by Aldo Moro. That memorial was in fact the most important political result ever got by the armed struggle against the State. It's not so difficult to imagine that Mario Moretti did not reveal the Memorials because it was too dangerous for him. Aldo Moro ended to find himself crashed between the red brigades and the diverted state machine attempt to maintain its "status quo". Well, by planning Moro Kidnapping, Brigate Rosse were really convinced that the political world in Italy would have implored pity for his life. On the contrary, they unexpectedly found themselves ready to save Aldo Moro's life by suggesting to exchange Moro at least with some of their fellows in jail, to obtain something for their organisation. Instead, the political world, or at least a part of it, secretly wished Moro's death unconditionally; the same political world which hoped, perhaps, to be able to save that democratic order that could be put in danger by the revelations of the old leader DC. torna ad inizio pagina

by abrapalabra